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Abstract 
 
 
The	paper	is	an	extension	of	the	Gabillon	and	Martimort	model	(2004),	which	studies	
how	 the	 independence	 of	 the	 institution	 in	 charge	 of	monetary	 policy	may	 stabilize	
inflationary	 fluctuations	 due	 to	 political	 uncertainty	 when	 the	 economy	 is	
characterized	by	lobbies	that	seek	to	promote	their	own	interests	to	the	detriment	of	
the	general	interests	of	society.	
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1.	Introduction	
The	 question	 of	 the	 Central	 Bank,	 its	 political	 independence,	 its	 tasks,	 and	 how	 it	
fulfils	 them,	 has	 returned	 to	 the	 centre	 of	 political	 discussion.	 The	 Anglo‐American	
subprime	 crisis	 of	 2007	 and	 the	 European	 sovereign	 debt	 crisis	 of	 2011	 generated	
intense	pressure	by	politicians,	financial	institutions,	employers	and	trade	unions	for	a	
further	extension	of	the	competence	of	Central	Banks	in	financial	supervision,	and	for	
expansion	of	the	objectives	and	degrees	of	freedom	in	the	monetary	policy	that	Central	
Banks	implement.	
This	paper	examines	a	 case	 in	which	 the	Central	Bank	must	pursue	 its	 objectives,	
while	 diverse	 actors,	 such	 as	 political	 institutions	 (government	 or	 parliament),	
financial	institutions	(commercial	banks,	investment	funds,	insurance	companies)	and	
in	general	all	organized	interest	groups	(lobbies)	apply	strong	pressure	on	the	Central	
Bank	 in	 order	 to	 ‘capture’	 it	 and	 ensure	 monetary	 policy	 decisions	 which	 do	 not	
conflict	with	their	interests.1	
This	 is	 a	 problem	 common	 to	 all	 processes	 of	 delegation	 by	 a	 principal	 –	 the	
government,	parliament	or	politicians	in	the	broad	sense	–	to	an	agent	–	the	‘authority’	
or	an	independent	bureaucrat.	
The	core	question	is	this:	what	are	the	costs	and	benefits	of	granting	independence	
to	these	regulatory	authorities?	
A	body	of	economic	literature	(Stigler,	1971;	Posner	1974;	Laffont	and	Tirole,	1993;	
Laffont	and	Martimort,	1999;	Faure‐Grimaud	and	Martimort,	2001)	has	sought	to	give	
                                                 
1	Canova	(2007,	p.	3)	discussed	the	non‐state	actors	that	impacted	on	the	present	global	economic	order	
by	capturing	state	institutions	–	the	regulated	industry	capturing	the	regulator	–	often	with	promises	of	
future	employment,	political	 support,	and	campaign	contributions.	But	he	mentioned	 that	 there	was	a	
“relative	silence	regarding	the	capture	of	Central	Banks,	perhaps	the	most	significant	agency	capture	by	
non‐state	actors	in	today's	de‐jure	international	financial	setup”. 
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an	answer	to	this	question	by	analysing	the	interactions	among	a	regulatory	agency,	its	
political	principals,	and	the	interest	group	which	is	supposed	to	be	regulated.	
In	 the	 case	 of	 monetary	 policy,	 the	 conflict	 of	 interest	 among	 economic	 agents,	
which	in	turn	reflects	their	diversity,	 is	essential	for	interpretation	of	these	costs	and	
benefits.	
The	 conflict	 of	 interest	 relates	 to	 the	 creditors/debtors	 issue	 in	 the	 economy.	
Inflation	reduces	the	real	weight	of	a	non‐indexed	debt	–	i.e.	one	which	remains	fixed	in	
nominal	terms	–	while	disinflation	aggravates	that	weight.	For	debtors,	inflation	means	
lower	 real	 debt,	 whereas	 disinflation	 means	 higher	 debt.	 Thus	 generated	 is	 a	
symmetrical	 redistributive	 effect:	 inflation	 redistributes	 from	 creditors	 to	 debtors;	
disinflation	does	so	from	debtors	to	creditors.	In	a	context	of	this	kind,	the	banks	and	
large	 financial	 groups2	 are	 anti‐inflation	 actors.3	 By	 contrast,	 small	 business	 owners	
and	farmers,	who	have	an	incentive	to	favour	‘surprise	inflation’	in	order	to	pay	lower	
real	 wages,	 or	 all	 economic	 actors	 exposed	 to	 the	 banking	 sector,	 are	 pro‐inflation	
groups.4	
To	be	noted	is	that	interest	groups	(lobbies)	have	a	particularly	influential	role	only	
if	 they	can	corrupt	and	acquire	particular	economic	 information	also	available	 to	 the	
Central	 Banker:	 in	 this	 case	 the	 lobbies	 have	 an	 interest	 in	 inducing	 the	 monetary	
authority	to	conceal	important	information	so	that	they	can	gain	an	advantage.	
The	 institutional	 design	 of	 monetary	 policy	 –	 for	 example,	 the	 degree	 of	
independence	 of	 the	 Central	 Bank	 –	 may	 also	 influence	 the	 relationship	 between	
interest	groups	and	the	monetary	authority	(Cukierman,	2013).	
                                                 
2	On	this	see	Posen	(1995),	who	argues	that	the	financial	sector	is	generally	the	main	supporter	of	the	
Central	Bank’s	political	independence. 
3	 Kane	 (1980)	 argues	 that	 builders	 and	 construction	 unions	 also	 form	 an	 anti‐inflationist	 group	 for	
similar	reasons. 
4	Of	course,	there	have	been	moments	in	history	–	for	example,	the	financial	crisis	of	2007	–	when	also	
the	financial	sector	has	found	it	convenient	to	ease	its	debts. 
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It	 can	 be	 also	 hypothesised	 that	 the	 more	 a	 Central	 Bank	 is	 independent	 of	 the	
government,	the	more	vulnerable	it	will	be	to	the	pressure	of	interest	groups.	
All	 these	 aspects	 have	 been	 analysed	 by	 Gabillon	 and	 Martimort	 (2004),	 who	
consider	a	‘two‐tier’	model	of	monetary	policy	where	the	Central	Banker	is	subject	to	
both	explicit	influence	by	the	elected	political	principal	through	a	contract	and	implicit	
influence	 by	 anti‐inflation	 interest	 groups	 seeking	 to	 ‘capture’	 monetary	 policy.	 The	
degree	of	political	independence	therefore	influences	the	agency	costs	paid	to	control	
the	 Central	 Banker.	 The	 result	 obtained	 by	 Gabillon	 and	 Martimort	 (2004)	 is	 that	
political	 independence	 increases	 the	 agency	 costs	 (agency	 cost	 effects)	 but	 prevents	
greater	fluctuations	in	inflation	due	to	exogenous	political	uncertainty	with	respect	to	
the	 election	 result	 (stabilization	 effect).	 On	 comparing	 the	 two	 effects,	 ex‐ante	 social	
welfare	increases	in	the	case	of	political	independence.	
This	 paper	 investigates	 how	 the	 independence	 of	 the	 Central	 Bank	 influences	 the	
election	 outcome	 when	 political	 uncertainty	 is	 endogenized	 in	 Gabillon	 and	
Martimort’s	model,	 considering	 forward‐looking	 voters	who	make	 their	 decisions	 by	
comparing	the	policy	platforms	proposed	by	the	two	main	political	competitors.	
The	 rest	 of	 the	 paper	 is	 organized	 as	 follows.	 Section	 2	 presents	 a	 summary	 of	
Gabillon	 and	 Martimort’s	 model;	 Section	 3	 describes	 our	 extension	 of	 this	 model;	
finally,	Section	4	sets	out	the	conclusions.	
2.	The	Gabillon‐Martimort	model	
Gabillon	and	Martimort		(2004)	provide	an	explanation	for	a	possible	link	between	
the	degree	of	 independence	of	 a	Central	Bank	 (CB)	and	policy	 stabilization.	The	 first	
key	 ingredient	 of	 	 the	 model	 is	 the	 possibility	 of	 capture	 of	 these	 agencies	 by	 the	
interest	groups	in	the	financial	sector.	Indeed,	in	a	world	of	information	asymmetries,	
regulators	 accumulate	 information	 about	 the	welfare	 effects	 of	 different	policies	 and	
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they	 can	 be	 bribed	 to	 manipulate	 information.	 The	 second	 ingredient	 is	 political	
uncertainty.	The	extent	to	which	a	Central	Bank	is	affiliated	to	a	political	party	affects	
the	likelihood	that	this	particular	agency	remains	in	place	as	political	powers	alternate	
in	 office.	 The	 status	 of	 the	 Central	 Bank	 thus	 significantly	 changes	 the	 collusive	
opportunities	between	this	Central	Bank	and	the	financial	industry.	
In	this	section,	we	summarize	the	main	elements	of	the	Gabillon‐Martimort	model.	
This	will	serve	the	purposes	of	the	next	section,	in	which	we	proceed	with	extension	of	
this	model.		
Contrary	 to	 the	 literature	 on	 monetary	 institutions	 that	 takes	 the	 contractual	
approach,	the	CB’s	incentive	mechanisms	are	not	designed	by	a	social	planner,	but	by	
partisan	 political	 principals5	 who	 want	 to	 please	 different	 constituencies	 and	 thus	
express	 different	 concerns	 for	 the	 trade‐off	 between	 price	 control	 and	 surprise	
inflation	 depending	 on	 whether	 they	 represent	 a	 leftist	 or	 a	 rightist	 constituency.6	
Because	of	information	asymmetry	between	the	CB	and	the	government,	there	is	also	
scope	for	collusion	between	private	interest	groups	and	the	CB.	However,	the	scope	for	
capture	depends	on	the	exact	control	rights	that	principals	retain	over	the	CB.	
	
2.1	Preferences	
CB:	The	CB	receives	a	monetary	transfer	s	from	whichever	political	principal	has	been	
elected	to	perform	the	monetary	policy.	The	CB’s	utility	is	V	=	s.	
This	transfer	can	be	viewed	as	the	share	of	the	central	bank	budget	and	resources	that	
can	be	diverted	by	the	monetary	authority	for	its	private	use.	Alternatively	it	can	also	
                                                 
5	 The	 political	 principal	 can	 be	 conceived	 as	 the	 elected	 legislative	 or	 executive	 branch	 of	 the	
government. 
6	It	is	a	contract	between	an	elected	political	principal,	a	CB,	and	the	private	sector	in	a	two‐tier	model	of	
monetary	policy. 
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be interpreted	 as	 the	 probability	 of	 being	 promoted	 to	 a	 higher	 position	 in	 the	 civil	
service	times	the	benefits		of	this	higher	position.			
Political	Principals:	A	political	principal	maximises	an	objective	 function	à	 la	Barro‐
Gordon	(1983):		
  sSW eii   2/2 	 (1)
where		is	the	inflation	level,	 e 	its	expectations,	 0i 	(with	  RLi , )	is	the	weight	
that	 the	 political	 principal	 gives	 to	 creating	 surprise	 inflation.		 is	 a	macroeconomic	
shock	affecting	both	political	principals’	concerns	for	output	expansion.	s	is	the	transfer	
given	to	the	CB.7	
A	 rightist	 government	 is	 less	 willing	 to	 create	 surprise	 inflation	 than	 a	 leftist	 one.	
0 RL  	represents	the	degree	of	polarization	of	the	society	i.e.	the	difference	
between	the	concerns	for	surprise	inflation	between	a	leftist	party	and	a	rightist	one.	
The	probabilities	of	each	of	these	two	political	principals	being	elected	are	exogenous						
( R  	with	probability	p	and	 L  	with	probability	1	 ‐	p).	 In	 the	next	section	we	
will	change	this	assumption.	
Interest	group:	The	anti‐inflationist	group	obtains	a	utility	from	unexpected	inflation	
which	is	equal	to:	  eIG   	with	β>0.8	
	
                                                 
7 The Central Bank has no weight in the principal’s objective function, capturing the fact that redistributing 
wealth to bureaucrats as such is not part of the government’s objective.  Alternatively, civil servants represent a 
group with negligible social weight. The main insights of the analysis are robust to the case where parties’ 
objective functions give the same positive (but less than one) weight to the regulator’s utility. (See Laffont and 
Martimort, 1999; Faure-Grimaud and Martimort, 2003, where they show that the separation of powers in 
regulation may act as a commitment against the threat of regulatory capture ). This means considering the 
objective function in this way:   ,2/2 sSW eii   	for	any	 .10     
8	The	pro‐inflationist	interest	group	can	be	easily	seen	in	the	model.	In	this	case	the	utility	of	this	group	
is:	  eIG   	with		>	0. 
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2.2.	Information	structure	
The	 shock	 is	  	 drawn	 from	 a	 common	 knowledge	 distribution	 on	   , 	 with	
respective	probabilities	1	 ‐	v	 and	v.	 It	 is	possible	 to	normalise	 1 	 so	 that	we	have	
01   .	Anti‐inflationist	incentives	are	thus	greater	when	 	is	realised.	The	CB	
and	 the	 interest	 group	 have	 complete	 information	 on	 the	 shock	 .	 This	 information	
structure	has	already	been	discussed	in	the	literature	by	Peek,	Rosemgren,	and	Tootell	
(1999),	who	 analyze	 the	 relationship	 between	monetary	 policy	 and	 problems	 in	 the	
banking	sector,	which	may	serve	as	an	early	indicator	of	deteriorating	macroeconomic	
conditions.	
Instead,	at	the	time	when	the	CB’s	incentives	are	designed,	the	political	principals	and	
the	 (non‐financial)	 private	 sector	 remain	 uninformed	 about	 the	 exact	 value	 of	 this	
shock.	
The	 CB	 can	 conceal	 verifiable	 evidence	 that	 the	 economy	 is	 doing	 badly	   	 and	
instead	 announce	 that	  ˆ .	 The	 mere	 possibility	 that	 the	 CB	 can	 conceal	 such	
information	 is	 the	 ‘key’	 to	 understanding	 the	 scope	 for	 collusion	 with	 an	 anti‐
inflationist	interest	group.	Conversely,	the	CB	can	issue	credible	reports	about	the	real	
state	of	the	economy.9	
	
2.3.	Incentive	contract	
Study	of	the	properties	of	mechanisms	designed	to	prevent	collusion	between	several	
members	 of	 an	 organization	 has	 become	 a	 highly	 active	 area	 of	 research	 since	 the	
pioneering	work	of	Tirole	(1986).	
                                                 
9 A ‘credible report’ means that the CB presents documents produced by its research department showing that 
the economy is in a good or bad state. 
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When,	as	in	our	case,	a	supervisor	(CB)	and	an	agent	(Financial	Sector)	have	complete	
information	 about	 an	 event	 (the	 real	 situation	 of	 the	 economy),	 while	 a	 principal	
(Political	 Principal)	 is	 not	 informed	 about	 this	 event,	 we	 can	 verify	 that	 agent–
supervisor	 coalitions	 can	 be	 formed	 to	 maximize	 private	 objectives	 and	 potentially	
defeat	the	purpose	for	which	that	supervision	has	been	established.	Our	analysis	will	
now	take	account	of	the	possibility	that	such	collusive	behaviour	of	the	agent	and	the	
supervisor	may	 occur.	We	 can	 assume	 that	 the	 two	 parties	 agree	 by	 way	 of	 a	 side‐
contract.	 This	 side‐contract	 will	 reduce	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 principal	 to	 extract	
information	 from	 the	 supervisor.	 To	 avoid	 such	 collusion,	 the	 principal	 can	 in	 turn	
reward	the	supervisor	for	every	report	on	the	true	state	of	the	economy.	
The	 optimal	 contract	 is	 always	 the	 contract	 that	 deters	 collusion.	 Should	 collusion	
occur,	at	 the	optimum	the	principal	can	always	alter	the	contract	by	making	quantity	
transfers	 independent	 of	 the	 supervisor’s	 report,	 and	 collusion	 will	 be	 deterred	
because	 it	 is	 no	 longer	 useful	 to	 the	 agent.	 This	 is	 known	 as	 the	 collusion‐proofness	
principle.	
Hence,	 to	 deter	 collusion,	 the	 principal	 must	 be	 sure	 to	 reward	 the	 supervisor	 for	
reporting	the	truth	by	an	amount	that	is	exactly	equal	to	the	maximum	bribe	that	the	
agent	 can	 offer	 the	 supervisor	 to	 keep	 quiet:	 anything	 less	 will	 open	 the	 door	 to	
collusion,	and	anything	more	will	be	a	waste	of	money.	
 
2.4.	CB	contracts	and	Collusion	technology	
The	 grand‐contract	 between	 the	 elected	 political	 principal	 and	 the	 CB	 consists	 of	
wages	 s	 and	 inflation	 targets	 .	  iis , 	 (resp.	  iis , )	 represents,	 respectively,	 the	
wage	and	inflation	target	when	the	economy	is	going	well	 	(resp.	goes	badly,	 ).	
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The	 side‐contract	 or	 collusion	 between	 the	 CB	 and	 the	 interest	 group	 consists	 of	
secret	 side‐transfers.	 The	 CB	 has	 all	 the	 bargaining	 power	 in	 the	 design	 of	 side‐
contracts.	When	the	economy	is	going	badly,	the	anti‐inflationist	interest	groups	want	
the	CB	to	report	 	to	keep	inflation	low.	From	the	false	report	of	the	CB	to	the	political	
principal,	the	interest	group	earns:		
   ieiieii   )( .	
The	interest	group	is	not	willing	to	bribe	the	CB	to	misreport	when	  	realizes,	since	
doing	so	would	increase	inflation.	However,	because	of	the	illegal	nature	of	capture,	the	
side‐contract	between	this	group	and	the	CB	suffers	from	some	transaction	costs10.	The	
exchange	of		units	of	bribes	only	yields	the	CB	a	private	benefit	 from	holding	office:	
2
2)( 
rkK  ,	 where	 10  k 	 and	 r	 >0,	 so	 that	 the	 transaction	 costs	 of	 side‐
contracting	are	equal:		‐	K().11		
	
2.5.	The	legal	status	of	the	CB	
The	CB	has	political	independence	(PI)	when	he	cannot	be	fired	by	the	newly‐elected	
political	 principal.	 Under	 political	 control	 (PC)	 the	 CB	 is	 in	 power	 if	 the	 party	 with	
which	he	 is	 affiliated	 is	 elected.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 principal	 has	 control	 rights	 on	who	
should	be	the	head	of	the	Central	Bank.	
	
                                                 
10 See Tirole (1992) for a first discussion of the origins of these transaction costs. 
11	Gabillon	and	Martimort	(2004)	assume	that	K(.)	 is	strictly	concave	and	increasing	in	the	interval	(0,	
k/r).	These	two	assumptions	capture	the	fact	that	transferring	more	wealth	to	the	CB	makes	it	easier	for	
the	interest	group	to	affect	his	decision‐making	but	the	marginal	efficiency	of	doing	so	decreases. 
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2.6.	Timings		
The	timing	of	the	game	depends	on	the	legal	status	of	the	Central	Bank.		
Under	political	control	it	is	as	follows:	
T	=	0:	 The	 electoral	 outcome	 realizes,	 and	 the	 preferences	 of	 the	 elected	 political	
principal	are	known	to	all	players	including	the	private	sector	of	the	economy.		
T	=	 1:	 The	 CB	 receives	 a	 grand‐contract	 from	 the	 political	 principal	 that	 has	 just	
been	 elected.	This	 contract	 stipulates	wages	 and	 inflation	 targets.	The	private	 sector	
forms	its	expectations	on	inflation	and	negotiates	wage	contracts.		
T	=	2:	Ex‐post	collusion	stage.	If	the	CB	has	accepted	the	grand‐contract,	he	offers	a	
side‐contract	 to	 the	 interest	group.	This	side‐contract	consists	of	a	bribe	 in	exchange	
for	hiding	the	item	of	information	that	he	has	available.	This	side‐contract	is	accepted	
or	rejected.		
T	=	3:	 	is	learned	by	the	CB	and	the	interest	group.		
T	 =	 4:	 The	 CB	 makes	 an	 announcement	 on	 the	 state	 of	 the	 economy,	 and	 the	
corresponding	 inflation	 target	 and	wage	 are	 implemented.	 Side‐transfers,	 if	 any,	 are	
exchanged.	
Importantly,	under	political	control	the	CB	and	the	interest	group	cannot	agree	on	a	
side‐contract	before	political	uncertainty	 is	 resolved.	 Instead,	 an	 independent	CB	 and	
the	interest	group	can	also	agree	on	an	ex‐ante	side‐contract.	
With	an	independent	CB,	the	timing	of	the	game	is	in	part	as	above:		
T	 =	 0:	 Both	 political	 parties	 propose	 their	 electoral	 platforms	 non‐cooperatively.	
These	 platforms	 consist	 of	 incentive	 contracts	 to	 the	 CB.	 These	 grand‐contracts	
stipulate	budgets	 and	 inflation	 targets	 conditionally	on	whether	 the	offering	party	 is	
elected.	The	CB	accepts	or	rejects	both	grand‐contracts,	being	still	uninformed	on	the	
state	of	the	economy	.	
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T	=	1:	Ex‐ante	collusion	stage.	If	the	CB	has	accepted	the	grand‐contracts,	he	offers	a	
side‐contract	 to	 the	 interest	 group.	 This	 side‐contract	 is	 now	 conditional	 on	 the	
electoral	outcome.	
T	=	2:	The	electoral	outcome	realizes	and	the	preferences	of	the	political	principal	
are	known	to	all	players	including	the	private	sector	of	the	economy,	which	now	forms	
its	expectations	on	inflation.		
Stages	T	=	3	and	T	=	4	are	then	the	same	as	with	affiliated	CBs.		
	
2.7.	A	benchmark	with	complete	information	
Under	 complete	 information,	 the	 first	 best	 inflation	 targets,	 i and	 i ,	 offered	 by	
the	elected	political	principal	i	maximize	expected	welfare	defined	as:	
 iiMax , 	    

 

  eiiiieiiii vv  2)1(2
22
	
s.t.	 iiei vv  )1(  .	
Rewriting	 the	 principal’s	 objective	 as	 a	 function	 of	 average	 inflation	 ei 	 and	 the	
difference	in	inflation	targets	   ii 	the	principal’s	problem	becomes:	
 ieiMax ,
    .2)1(2
22



  iii
e
i vv  	
In	the	case	of	full	commitment	to	a	policy	rule,	the	optimal	monetary	policy	requires:	
0FBei 	
The	difference	in	inflation	targets	between	both	states	of	the	world	is	thus:	
0  iFBi 	
The	 above	 commitment	 policy	 has	 been	 extensively	 criticized	 for	 not	 being	 time‐
consistent.	 Gabillon	 and	 Martimort	 investigate	 instead	 how	 this	 policy	 is	 robust	 to	
12 
political	 pressures.	 Taking	 this	 perspective	 highlights	 that	 different	 institutional	
designs	 offer	 different	 responses	 to	 agency	 problems.	 They	 find	 that:	
PC
L
PI
L
PI
R
PC
R   .12	 However,	 granting	 political	 independence	 to	 the	 CB	
somewhat	 insulates	monetary	policy	 from	political	 fluctuations:	a	 stabilization	effect.	
The	 cost	 of	 independence	 is	 nevertheless	 that	 the	 CB	 is	 more	 prone	 to	 capture	 by	
interest	groups:	a	delegation	effect.	The	stabilization	effect	is	always	strong	enough	to	
dominate	the	delegation	effect.	Hence,	ex	ante	social	welfare	is	greater	under	political	
independence	than	under	political	control.	
	
3.	An	extension	of	Gabillon‐Martimort’s	model	with	
endogenous	political	uncertainty	
In	 this	 section,	 election	 probabilities	 are	 thus	 endogenized,	 with	 each	 party’s	
probability	of	success	depending	on	both	 its	own	and	the	other	parties’	policies.	This	
approach13	 considerably	 revises	 the	 properties	 of	 the	 classic	 partisan	 model.	 Most	
notably,	we	demonstrate	that	endogenous	voting	will	have	important	consequences	for	
the	magnitude	of	the	partisan	effect.	
Let	 us	 now	 endogenize	 political	 uncertainty	 in	 Gabillon‐Martimort’s	 model	 by	
assuming	 that	 forward‐looking	 voters	 decide	 their	 ballot	 by	 comparing	 the	 expected	
payoffs	 that	 they	will	 obtain	 with	 each	 party.	 Voters	 are	 ideologically	 differentiated	
with	respect	to	the	trade‐off	that	they	would	implement	between	surprise	inflation	and	
                                                 
12	The	difference	in	inflation	targets	under	political	control	is:	
vr
vkiPC
i /1
/
2
 
 	with	  RLi , .	
The	 difference	 in	 inflation	 targets	 under	 political	 independence	 is:	  
vr
vrpvkRPI
R /1
/1/
2
2

 
 	and	  
vr
vrpvkLPI
L /1
//
2
2

 
 . 
13 A similar approach is considered by Alesina  (1988), Balke (1988) and Ellis (1991). 
13 
price	 stabilization	 i.e.	 with	 respect	 to	 their	.14	 This	 parameter	 may	 in	 this	 case	 be	
interpreted	as	representing	the	voter’s	location	in	the	wealth	distribution.	
	
3.1.	Monetary	policy	under	political	control	
Let	 us	 first	 consider	 the	 case	when	 the	 Central	 Banker	 is	 under	 political	 control.	
Because	 agent	 	 is	 indifferent	 between	 a	 rightist	 policy	 R 	 and	 a	 leftist	 policy	
implementing	 L ,	it	must	obtain	the	same	expected	payoff	with	both	policies.	Hence:	
   LR SWSW    	
Following	 Gabillon	 and	 Martimort	 (2004),	 we	 now	 write	 social	 welfare,	 in	 regime	
political	control	with	party	  RLi , ,	under	asymmetric	information	and	the	threat	of	
capture,	thus:	
   iSW         iPCiiiiei ACvv  


  212
22
15		 						(2)	
where	      iiPCi KvAC   1 	is	the	agency	cost	associated	with	the	delegation	of	
monetary	policy	to	the	CB.16	
                                                 
14	This	depends	on	differences	in	the	ideologies	if	voters	are	rightist	or	leftist. 
15	 Even	 in	 the	 case	 of	 monetary	 policy	 offered	 when	 the	 central	 banker	 benefits	 from	 political	
independence,	the	SW	function	is	the	same;	only	the	agency	cost	AC	changes. 
16	In	effect,	an	optimal	monetary	policy	proposed	by	principal	i	must	implement	collusion‐proofness	at	
minimal	 agency	 cost:	       iissiPCi svsvAC ii  1min, 	 s.t.	 a	 collusion‐proofness	 constraint	 and	
participation	 constraint.	 For	 the	 first	 constraint,	 the	 Central	 Banker	must	 be	 sufficiently	 rewarded	 to	
report	 truthfully,	 so	 that	 colluding	 with	 the	 anti‐inflationist	 interest	 group	 becomes	 a	 dominated	
strategy.	The	grand‐contract	must	thus	satisfy	a	collusion‐proofness	constraint:	  iii Kss  .	The	
left‐hand	side	represents	the	wage	differential	necessary	to	prevent	collusive	behaviour	and	to	induce	a	
truthful	 announcement	 by	 the	 Central	 Banker.	 The	 right‐hand	 side	 represents	 the	 benefits	 that	 the	
Central	Banker	 can	obtain	 from	his	 collusive	 relationship	with	 the	anti‐inflationist	 interest	group.	For	
the	second	constraint,	the	Central	Banker	prefers	to	enter	the	public	sector	rather	than	obtain	a	utility	
equal	 to	 zero,	 so	 that	 the	 participation	 constraint	 must	 be	 satisfied:	 0is .	 Note	 that	 when	
0  ii ,	 the	 two	 constraints	 imply	 also	 0is .	 This	 last	 participation	 constraint	 can	 be	
omitted	 in	 what	 follows	 as	 long	 as	 the	 stake	 for	 collusion	 remains	 positive.	 For	 further	 details	 on	
collusion‐proofness	constraint	and	participation	constraint	see	Gabillon	and	Martimort	(2004,	p.	364). 
14 
Under	 asymmetric	 information	 and	 political	 control,	 the	 optimal	 collusion‐proof	
monetary	policy	offered	by	a	political	principal	i	entails	no	inflationary	bias,	so	that:	
0ei 	
We	now	rewrite	the	social	welfare	function	as	follows:	
   iSW       


  2
2
22 ii
i
ii
rkv  	 			(3)	
The	probability	of	the	political	party	i	(with	i=	Right, Left)	being	elected	is	a	function	of	
politically	induced	fluctuations	in	the	variance	of	inflation,	thus:	  RLpP   .	
We	 take	 from	 Friedman	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 variance	 of	 inflation.	 	 Indeed,	 Friedman	
(1977)	 considered	 why	 policy	 makers	 may	 be	 affected	 by	 inflation	 variability.			
Friedman	wanted		to	explain	why	there	is	a	positive	correlation		between	the	level	of		
inflation	and	 the	variability	of	 inflation	across	 countries	and	over	 time	 for	any	given		
country.		In		Friedman’s		analysis,		a		government		may		temporarily	pursue		a		set		of		
policy		goals		(output,		employment)		that		lead		to		high	inflation;		this,		in		turn,		elicits		
strong	 	 political	 	 pressure	 	 to	 	 reduce	 	 the	 debasing	 	 of	 	 the	 	 currency.	 	 Chowdhury		
(1991)		re‐examined		the	relation		between		the		level		and		the		variability		of		inflation		
for	 a	 sample	 of	 sixty‐six	 countries	 over	 the	 1955–90	period.	His	 results	 indicate	 the	
presence	 of	 a	 significant	 positive	 relation	 between	 the	 rate	 of	 inflation	 and	 its	
variability.	
In	 a	 Nash	 equilibrium	 of	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 political	 right‐wing	 party	 platforms, RZ 	
chooses	 R 	so	that	it	maximizes:	
        LRLRRRL RSWpSWp    1 	 				(4)	
Then:	
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RZ 	now	takes	 into	account	the	 impact	of	 its	policy	choice	on	the	probability	of	being	
elected.	The	corresponding	first‐order	condition	(FOC)	is	now	written	as:	
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After	some	algebra	we	obtain:	
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In	the	case	of	the	left,	 LZ chooses	 L so	that	it	maximizes:	
        LRLRRL LL SWpSWp    1 	 (7)
Then:	
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The	corresponding	FOC	is	now	written	as:	
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(8)	
It	follows	that:	
 
        
  
 effectElectoral 
RLRL
L
RL
RL
L
PC
L
v
r
v
K
p
p
v
r
v
K















22
22 2
1
11
'
1







	
(9)	
(6)	and	(9)	represent	a	system	of	nonlinear	differential	equations.	We	solve	this	system	
numerically.	The	results	of	the	simulations	are	shown	in	figures	(1)	(2)	(3)	and	(4)	for	
different	values	of	some	parameters.	
	
Figure:	4–1	 Figure:	4–2	
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Figure:	4–3	 Figure:	4–4	
	
Direct	observations	show	that	the	electoral	effect	is	negative	with	the	left	and	positive	
with	the	right.17	 Indeed,	reducing	(resp.	 increasing)	the	difference	 in	 inflation	targets	
now	increases	the	probability	that	the	left	(resp.	right)	is	elected	and,	for	this	reason,	
the	left	offers	a	platform	shifted	downwards.	
	
	
3.2.	Monetary	Policy	under	political	independence	
Under	the	political	 independence	of	the	Central	Banker,	monetary	policy	is	carried	
out	 for	both	political	principals.	For	 this	 reason,	 the	Central	Banker	 can	offer	a	 side‐
contract	to	the	anti‐inflationist	interest	group	before	political	uncertainty	is	resolved.18		
                                                 
17 See note 74 to compare this results with those by Gabillon-Martimort. 
18	Gabillon	and	Martimort,	 in	order	 to	prevent	collusion	between	 interest	groups	and	central	bankers,	
consider	an	ex	ante	collusion‐proofness	constraint:		         LRLLRR ppKsspssp   11 	
The	left‐hand	side	above	represents	the	wages	expected	to	prevent	collusive	behaviour;	the	right‐hand	
side	represents	the	bribe	that	the	anti‐inflation	group	is	willing	to	pay	to	the	Central	Banker	to	make	him	
lie	in	his	announcement	of	the	economic	shock.	The	Central	Banker	strictly	prefers	to	commit	to	a	side‐
contract	before	political	uncertainty	resolves	rather	than	wait	 for	 the	outcome	of	 the	election.	 Indeed,	
because	the	efficiency	of	side‐contracting	K(.)	is	a	strictly	concave	function	of	the	collusive	stake:		          LRLR KppKppK   11 	
18 
Therefore,	with	political	independence,	the	agency	cost	associated	with	the	delegation	
of	monetary	policy	to	the	CB	is	written	thus	in	the	case	of	a	rightist	government:	
           LLLRRPIR sspppKvpAC  1111  (10)
in	the	case	of	a	leftist	government:	
          RRLRLPIL sspppKvpAC   111 1 (11)
Because	 agent	 	 is	 indifferent	 between	 a	 rightist	 policy	 R 	 and	 a	 leftist	 policy	
implementing	 L ,	it	must	obtain	the	same	payoff	with	both	policies.	To	simplify,	we	
focus	on	 the	 case	where	both	parties	pay	 the	 same	wage	 to	 the	 independent	Central	
Banker	 in	 an	 interior	 equilibrium,	 i.e.,	we	posit	 a	 particular	 distribution	 of	 the	 gains	
from	dealing	with	a	common	bureaucrat.	
	The	identity	of	the	swing	voter		is	now	such	that:	
           LLRR KvSWKvSW    11 (12)
In	a	Nash	equilibrium,	 RZ 	chooses	 R 	so	that	it	maximizes:	
               
            LRLRL
RRLLRRLRRRL
ppkvkpv
kpvSWpSWp

 


)1(111
11 	
and	then	follows:	
                                                                                                                                                      
The	 optimal	monetary	 policy	 proposed	 by	 principal	 i	must	 implement	 collusion‐proofness	 at	minimal	
agency	 cost:	       iissiPIi svsvAC ii  1min, 	 s.t.	 a	 collusion‐proofness	 constraint	 and	 participation	
constraint.	The	participation	constraints	are	 identical	 to	the	case	of	political	dependence	 0is ,	 from	
which	it	follows	that	 0is .	For	every	detail	on	this	point	see	Gabillon	and	Martimort,	(2004,	p.368). 
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The	corresponding	FOC	becomes:		
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After	some	algebra	we	obtain:	
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In	a	Nash	equilibrium,	 LZ 	chooses	 L 	so	that	it	maximizes:		
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and	then	follows:	
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It	follows	that:	
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(14)	 and	 (16)	 represent	 a	 system	 of	 nonlinear	 differential	 equations.	 We	 solve	 this	
system	numerically.	The	results	of	the	simulations	are	shown	in	figures:	(5)	(6)	(7)	and	
(8)	for	different	values	of	some	parameters.	
Figure:	4–5	 Figure:	4‐6	
	
Figure:	4–7	 Figure:	4‐8	
(16) 
22 
	
For	both	parties,	the	electoral	effect	still	includes	a	term	taking	the	same	form	as	with	a	
politically	 dependent	 Central	 Banker.	 However,	 there	 appears	 a	 new	 term	 which	
captures	the	impact	of	the	choice	of	the	platform	on	the	agency	cost	of	delegation	to	an	
independent	Central	Banker.	
More	importantly,	the	greater	sensitivity	of	the	swing	voter	to	inflation	variations(  )	
under	 independence	may	 increase	 the	convergence	of	 the	platforms	towards	middle‐
road	 policies.	 This	 is	 clear	 on	 comparing	 the	 results	 of	 the	 system	 (1)	 (which	 is	 the	
institutional	 monetary	 regime	 under	 political	 dependence)	 with	 the	 results	 of	 the	
system	(2)	(which	is	the	institutional	monetary	regime	under	political	independence).	
Figure:	4–9	 Figure:	4–10	
Figure:	4–11	 Figure:	4–12	
23 
This	would	reinforce	Gabillon‐Martimorts’	finding	that	the	independent	Central	Banker	
makes	policies	converge	further	one	towards	the	order	
	
	
4.	Conclusions	
The	foregoing	analysis	has	examined	the	interesting	feedback	between	institutions	
and	election	results.	In	this	case,	the	amount	of	political	uncertainty	and	the	choice	of	
institutional	design	have	been	determined	simultaneously	in	the	model.	Endogenizing	
political	 uncertainty	 reinforces	 the	 stabilization	 effect.	 A	 rightist	 (resp.	 leftist)	
policymaker	increases	(resp.	decreases)	the	variance	of	inflation	and	now	looks	much	
more	like	a	leftist	(resp.	rightist)	policymaker.	
This	 finding	 strengthens	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 the	 independence	 of	 the	 CB	 is	 the	 best	
institutional	 design	with	which	 to	 protect	 the	 general	 interests	 of	 ‘society’.	 In	 fact,	 a	
Central	Banker	independent	from	the	political	principal	that	appoints	it	represents	the	
best	 control	 by	 the	minority	with	 respect	 to	 decisions	 taken	 by	 the	 elected	 political	
majority.	
This	line	of	research	could	continue	in	various	directions.	The	first	is	consideration	
of	political	 systems	more	 complex	 than	a	 two‐party	one:	 that	 is,	multi‐party	 systems	
and	coalition	governments,	which	are	generally	associated	with	parliamentary	political	
regimes.	 The	 political	 economics	 literature19	 emphasises,	 in	 fact,	 that	 these	
characteristics	 increase	 political	 uncertainty.	 This	 suggests	 that	 the	 benefits	 of	 the	
Central	Bank’s	political	independence	are	greater	in	parliamentary	systems:	an	aspect	
which	should	be	analysed	both	theoretically	and	empirically.	
                                                 
19	See	Persson	and	Tabellini	(2000;	2003). 
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A	second	direction	for	further	inquiry	within	the	framework	analysed	is	theoretical	
and	 empirical	 investigation	 of	 the	 possible	 separation	 of	 banking	 supervision	 from	
monetary	 policy.	 This	 should	 increase	 the	 transaction	 costs	 deriving	 from	 collusion	
between	banks	and	monetary	authorities.	
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